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We give a comprehensive and constructive proof of the no-
go theorem of a bit commitment given by Mayers, Lo, and
Chau from the viewpoint of quantum information theory. It
is shown that there is a trade-off relation between information
acquired by Bob during the commitment phase and the ability
to change a commit bit by Alice during the opening phase.
It is clarified that a protocol that is unbiased to both Alice
and Bob cannot be, at the same time, secure against both
parties. Fundamental physical constraints that govern this
no-go theorem are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In brief, a bit commitment (BC) is the following task
that is executed in two steps ((a) and (b) below) by two
mistrustful parties, a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob.
(a) Commit phase (C-phase): Alice chooses a bit (b = 0
or 1) and commits it to Bob. That is, she gives Bob a
piece of evidence that she has a bit b in mind and that
she cannot change it (in this case, the commitment is
said to be binding). Bob cannot learn the value of the
committed bit from that evidence until Alice reveals fur-
ther information (in this case, the commitment is said to
be concealing).
(b) Opening phase (O-phase): At a later time, Alice
opens the commitment. That is, she tells Bob the value
of b and convinces him that it is indeed the genuine bit
that she chose during the C-phase. If Alice changes the
value, it can be discovered by Bob.
A BC is an important cryptographic primitive with
many applications in more sophisticated tasks and is of
great theoretical and practical interest. Current classical
BC protocols are proven secure by invoking some un-
proven computational assumption; that is, complexity of
some kind of mathematical problems such as the hard-
ness of factoring large integers. After the invention of the
quantum computing algorithm that makes the computa-
tional assumption totally invalid, it has been brought
to many researchers’ attention whether there exists a
BC protocol that is guaranteed secure solely by physi-
cal principles. In recent years, Mayers, Lo, and Chau
have proven that an unconditionally secure BC is im-
possible (no-go theorem for a BC) under the standard
nonrelativistic assumption. [1,2] However, although their
discussions are quite correct, their proofs are a bit formal
and nonconstructive. It is not yet clear what prevents us
from implementing the unconditionally secure BC pro-
tocol. In this paper, we give a constructive proof of the
no-go theorem for a BC that would make things more
transparent and convincing from the viewpoint of quan-
tum information theory. We clarify why quantum me-
chanics does not help a quantum BC protocol to achieve
more than a classical one does.
II. MODEL AND FORMULATION OF THE BIT
COMMITMENT PROTOCOL
First, let us consider an honest protocol. The most
important point concerning the BC protocol is that Alice
needs to unveil a value of b in the O-phase consistently
with information transmitted in the C-phase. From the
information-theoretic point of view, this implies that one
bit of classical information should be transmitted from
Alice to Bob at the end of the protocol. Therefore, when
we set Ic and Io as the amounts of information in a bit
transmitted in the C-phase and O-phase, the following
identity holds:
Ic + Io = 1. (1)
Namely, the BC protocol is essentially a split transmis-
sion of one-bit information in two temporally separated
steps: one in the C-phase and the other in the O-phase.
Only a fraction of the bit information needs to be trans-
mitted in each step. Noting this fact, we can formulate
the quantum BC protocols reported so far [3–6] as fol-
lows.
In order to demand unconditional security, Alice re-
veals to Bob quantum information as a piece of evidence
of her commitment by transmitting a system, such as a
photon or an electron, in the C-phase. In the O-phase,
she reveals to Bob classical information which consists of
the value of b and the measurement basis on the system.
Finally, Alice and Bob test the consistency between the
reported value of b and the measurement results of the
system.
According to the quantum description of the proto-
col involving classical communication suggested by Tal
Mor, let subsystem B (Bob’s system) be the system with
1
arbitrary dimensional state space HB that carries quan-
tum information in the C-phase and subsystem A (Al-
ice’s system) be the system with arbitrary dimensional
state spaceHA that carries classical information in the O-
phase. [7] Let χABb be the genuine states of the joint sys-
tem AB to be prepared by Alice according to her choice
of b. Then, Eq. (1) is equivalent to the condition that
χAB
0
and χAB
1
are orthogonal in the joint Hilbert space,
HAB = HA ⊗HB; i.e.,
χAB
0
χAB
1
= χAB
1
χAB
0
= 0. (2)
Here, to avoid confusion throughout this paper, we use
superscripts to denote the appropriate state space for a
state or an operator. According to the protocol, by trans-
mitting a subsystem B to Bob, Alice reveals, in general,
nonorthogonal marginal states
ρBb = TrAχ
AB
b (3)
(b = 0 or 1) in the C-phase. It is proven in Appendix A
that from condition (2), we can always find two mutually
orthogonal purifications
∣∣ψABb 〉 of ρBb in the orthogonal
subspace in which the support of the state χABb lies. Any
set of two orthonormal states in HAB should be repre-
sented by two orthonormal states in the two-dimensional
subspace M spanned by
{∣∣0AB〉 , ∣∣1AB〉} in HAB. Fur-
thermore, any such subspace M can be defined by a set
of two orthonormal states in HAB:∣∣0AB〉 =∑α ∣∣a′A〉 ∣∣aB〉 ,∣∣1AB〉 =∑β ∣∣b′A〉 ∣∣bB〉 , (4)
with an appropriate choice of two sets of orthonormal
states
{∣∣a′A〉 ∣∣aB〉} and {∣∣b′A〉 ∣∣bB〉} and coefficients α
and β, where
{{∣∣a′A〉} ,{∣∣b′A〉}} ({{∣∣aB〉} ,{∣∣bB〉}})
makes up a Schmidt basis for HA (HB). Therefore,
given a set of the mutually orthogonal purifications{∣∣ψAB
0
〉
,
∣∣ψAB
1
〉}
in HAB, we can always find the follow-
ing form of Schmidt decomposition [8–10],{ ∣∣ψAB
0
〉
= cos θ
∣∣0AB〉+ sin θ ∣∣1AB〉 ,∣∣ψAB
1
〉
= − sin θ ∣∣0AB〉+ cos θ ∣∣1AB〉 , (5)
by choosing appropriate Schmidt coefficients and absorb-
ing any phase factors in the definition of the bases. As
a result of Eqs. (4) and (5), the marginal states ρB
0
and
ρB
1
are commutable and diagonalized simultaneously by
Schmidt basis as
ρB
0
= TrA
∣∣ψAB
0
〉 〈
ψAB
0
∣∣ = cos2 θρˆB
0
+ sin2 θρˆB
1
,
ρB
1
= TrA
∣∣ψAB
1
〉 〈
ψAB
1
∣∣ = sin2 θρˆB
0
+ cos2 θρˆB
1
, (6)
where TrA denotes a partial trace over subsystem A, and
two states
ρˆB
0
= TrA
∣∣0AB〉 〈0AB∣∣ =∑α2 ∣∣aB〉 〈aB∣∣ ,
ρˆB
1
= TrA
∣∣1AB〉 〈1AB∣∣ =∑ β2 ∣∣bB〉 〈bB∣∣ , (7)
are orthogonal on HB; i.e., ρˆ
B
0
ρˆB
1
= ρˆB
1
ρˆB
0
= 0. The
forms of ρˆB
0
and ρˆB
1
can be freely chosen in the protocol
and various complex forms have been proposed to pre-
vent cheating of both parties, but the concrete forms are
irrelevant to the subject in the following discussion.
III. CHEATING STRATEGIES
According to the model given in Sec II, we will evaluate
the performance of Alice’s and Bob’s cheating.
A. Bob’s cheating
The purpose of Bob’s cheating is to obtain as much
information as possible about b during the C-phase from
the marginal states ρBb . In the following, the amount of
available information about b for Bob during the C-phase
is evaluated as a measure of his cheating performance.
From the protocol agreed by Alice and Bob, the states
χABb to be prepared by Alice are known to them. There-
fore, Bob can calculate the Schmidt bases,
{∣∣aB〉} and{∣∣bB〉}, that diagonalize the marginal states ρB
0
and ρB
1
beforehand. Bob can perform an optimal measurement
for distinguishing ρB
0
and ρB
1
by making use of the orthog-
onality between ρˆB
0
and ρˆB
1
. To describe a measure of the
available information about b for Bob from ρBb , consider
the fidelity between ρB
0
and ρB
1
. [11,12] It is given by
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = TrB
√(
ρB
1
)1/2
ρB
0
(
ρB
1
)1/2
. (8)
Noting that ρˆB
0
and ρˆB
1
are orthogonal, we can calculate(
ρB
1
)1/2
from Eq. (6) as
(
ρB
1
)1/2
= |sin θ| (ρˆB
0
)1/2
+ |cos θ| (ρˆB
1
)1/2
(9)
in the representation in which ρˆB
0
and ρˆB
1
are diagonal.
Therefore, Eq. (6) gives
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) =
1
2
|sin 2θ|TrB
(
ρˆB
0
+ ρˆB
1
)
= |sin 2θ| . (10)
The smaller the fidelity is, the more Bob can distin-
guish between ρB
0
and ρB
1
correctly; therefore, he can
gain more information about b. To confirm this, we con-
sider the quantum error probability which gives the lower
limit of error rate for distinguishing ρB
0
and ρB
1
. [12–14]
It is given as
PBoberr (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) =
1
2
− 1
4
TrB
∣∣ρB
0
− ρB
1
∣∣ . (11)
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Noting again that ρˆB
0
and ρˆB
1
are orthogonal, it follows
from Eq. (6) that
ρB
0
− ρB
1
= cos 2θ
(
ρˆB
0
− ρˆB
1
)
(12)
in the representation in which ρˆB
0
and ρˆB
1
are diagonal.
Thus, it follows that
PBoberr (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) =
1− |cos 2θ|
2
=
1−
√
1− (F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
)
)2
2
.
(13)
Let us now introduce distinguishability between ρB
0
and
ρB
1
as
D(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = PBobcor − PBoberr =
1
2
TrB
∣∣ρB
0
− ρB
1
∣∣ . (14)
Then, the larger the distinguishability is, the more Bob
can distinguish between ρB
0
and ρB
1
correctly. Thus, the
distinguishability gives a measure of the available infor-
mation about b for Bob from ρBb . It is easily seen that
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) and D(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) satisfy
(
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
)
)2
+
(
D(ρB
0
, ρB
1
)
)2
= 1. (15)
Therefore, there is a trade-off relationship between
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) and D(ρB
0
, ρB
1
); that is, the smaller F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
)
is, the larger D(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) is and the more correctly Bob
can distinguish ρB
0
and ρB
1
, and vice versa.
Let us turn to the information-theoretic measure of
available information for Bob. Mutual information be-
tween the value of genuine b and the value of b that is
judged from the measurement of ρB
0
and ρB
1
is an appro-
priate measure from the viewpoint of information theory.
When Alice chooses the value of commit bit b between
0 and 1 with equiprobability, this measure depends only
on ρB
0
and ρB
1
and is given by
IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = 1−H(PBoberr (ρB0 , ρB1 )), (16)
where H(p) = −p log
2
p− (1−p) log
2
(1−p) is an entropy
function (in bit).
B. Alice’s cheating
The purpose of Alice’s cheating is to unveil her commit
bit b at her will in the O-phase while ensuring unveiled
b does not conflict with Bob’s measurement of his sub-
system B revealed by her during the C-phase. From the
agreed protocol, Alice can calculate the purification given
in Eqs. (5) and (4) beforehand.
In the following, her ability to change the commit bit is
evaluated for two known cheating strategies as a measure
of her cheating performance.
1. Mayer’s strategy
This is a strategy which was first proposed by Mayers.
[1] Alice honestly reveals either ρB
0
or ρB
1
in the C-phase
by transmitting subsystem B of the joint system AB pre-
pared in the arbitrary purification associated to either ρB
0
or ρB
1
. In the O-phase, by a local unitary operation on
subsystem A in her hand, she can change the joint state
into any purification
∣∣ψ¯AB
b¯
〉
of her chosen ρBb that satisfies
ρBb = TrA
∣∣ψ¯ABb¯ 〉 〈ψ¯ABb¯ ∣∣ (17)
and
0 ≤ 〈ψABb |ψ¯ABb¯ 〉 ≤ F (ρB0 , ρB1 ), (18)
where b¯ = b ⊕ 1. [8,11] Then, according to her necessity,
she changes the joint state into the fake states,∣∣ψ¯AB
1
〉
= − cos θ
∣∣0AB〉+ sin θ ∣∣1AB〉 ,∣∣ψ¯AB
0
〉
= sin θ
∣∣0AB〉+ cos θ ∣∣1AB〉 . (19)
Here, the state
∣∣ψ¯ABb 〉 saturates the upper bound of〈
ψABb |ψ¯ABb¯
〉
in Eq. (18) and is most parallel to the state∣∣ψABb 〉. [11] She tells Bob the basis to be used for his
measurement on subsystem B that is found from her pro-
jection measurement of subsystem A by an appropriate
basis
{∣∣eAj 〉}. Bob performs projection measurement on
his subsystem B according to her instruction and checks
her commitment from the consistency between the value
of b that is unveiled by Alice in the O-phase and his mea-
surement results.
The fake state
∣∣ψ¯AB
b¯
〉
given in Eq. (19) is optimal
in Mayer’s strategy. To confirm this, we consider the
probability PAliceerr that Alice causes and Bob finds an
inconsistency between the unveiled value of b and Bob’s
measured data. It is proven in Appendix B that PAliceerr
is zero when Alice prepares the genuine state χABb or the
purification
∣∣ψABb 〉, and
PAliceerr ≥ 1−
∣∣〈ψABb |ψ¯ABb¯ 〉∣∣2 (20)
when she prepares the fake state
∣∣ψ¯AB
b¯
〉
, where equality
holds if and only if
∣∣ψ¯AB
b¯
〉
lies in the subspaceM spanned
by a set of orthonormal states
{∣∣0AB〉 , ∣∣1AB〉}. Applying
Eq. (18) to Eq. (20) yields
PAliceerr ≥ 1−
(
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
)
)2
= PAliceM err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
). (21)
The state
∣∣ψ¯AB
b¯
〉
in Eq. (19) yields the lower bound
PAliceM err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) for the probability PAliceerr that depends
only on ρB
0
and ρB
1
. Therefore, the fake states in Eq.
(19) give the least possibility of disclosing her cheating
to Bob and they are optimal for this strategy. The lower
limit PAliceM err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) is a convenient measure of Alice’s
ability to change her commitment in the O-phase.
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It should be noted that Mayer’s strategy is asymmet-
ric with respect to the value of b that Alice unveils in
the O-phase. For example, consider Alice reveals ρB
0
in
the C-phase. Then, if she unveils b = 0 honestly in the
O-phase, Bob’s measured data on his subsystem B is per-
fectly consistent with her disclosure and PAliceerr is zero.
Conversely, if she wants to unveil b = 1, she can cheat
Bob successfully with the probability
PAliceM err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) = cos2 2θ (22)
by preparing the fake state
∣∣ψ¯AB
1
〉
. Here, Eqs. (10) and
(21) are used to derive Eq. (22). Thus, the lower limit
PAliceM err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) depends on b that Alice unveils in the O-
phase. It should be further noted that PAliceM err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) >
1/2 if F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) < 1/
√
2. This means that Mayer’s strat-
egy can be applicable only when F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = |sin 2θ| ≥
1/
√
2.
Now let us turn to the information-theoretic measure
of Alice’s cheating performance. Let IAliceM be mutual
information between the value of b that Alice unveils and
the value of b that Bob judged from his measurement on
his subsystem B in the O-phase. Taking into account the
asymmetry noted in the previous paragraph, we get the
upper bound of IAliceM as a function only of ρ
B
0
and ρB
1
as
follows:
IAliceM (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) =
1
2
+
1
2
{
1−H(PAliceM err(ρB0 , ρB1 ))
}
. (23)
Here, IAliceM (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) is considered to be a good
information-theoretic measure of Alice’s ability to change
her commit bit for this strategy.
2. Hardy-Kent’s strategy
This is a strategy which was first given by Koashi
and Imoto in the context of quantum key distribution
[15], but later applied to the BC protocol by Hardy
and Kent. [6] According to this strategy, Alice reveals
ρ¯B =
(
ρB
0
+ ρB
1
)
/2 in the C-phase by transmitting the
subsystem B of the joint system AB prepared in the ar-
bitrary purification of ρ¯B. When she unveils her commit-
ment in the O-phase, she can change the joint state into
any purification
∣∣ψ¯ABb 〉 of ρ¯B satisfying
ρ¯B = TrA
∣∣ψ¯ABb 〉 〈ψ¯ABb ∣∣ (24)
and
0 ≤ 〈ψABb |ψ¯ABb 〉 ≤ F (ρBb , ρ¯B) (25)
by performing a local unitary operation on her subsystem
A. Then, according to her choice of b, she changes the
joint state into the fake state, for example, so that when
0 ≤ θ ≤ pi/2,
∣∣ψ¯AB
0
〉
=
(∣∣0AB〉+ ∣∣1AB〉) /√2,∣∣ψ¯AB
1
〉
= − (∣∣0AB〉− ∣∣1AB〉) /√2. (26)
Here,
∣∣ψ¯ABb 〉 saturates the upper bound of 〈ψABb |ψ¯ABb 〉
in Eq. (25) and is the most parallel to the state
∣∣ψABb 〉.
[11] She tells Bob the basis to be used for his measure-
ment on subsystem B that is found from her projection
measurement on her subsystem A by an appropriate ba-
sis
{∣∣eAj 〉}. Bob performs projection measurement on his
system according to her instruction and checks her com-
mitment from the consistency between the value of b that
is unveiled by Alice in the O-phase and his measurement
results.
It can also be proven from Appendix B that the lower
bound PAliceHK err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) of the probability PAliceerr in this
strategy depends only on ρB
0
and ρB
1
, and it is given by
PAliceHK err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) = 1− (F (ρBb , ρ¯B))2 = 1− F (ρB0 , ρB1 )2 .
(27)
The states
∣∣ψ¯ABb 〉 in Eq. (26) yield the lower bound
PAliceHK err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
). Therefore, they are optimal for this
strategy. The lower limit PAliceHK err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) gives a con-
venient measure of Alice’s ability to change her commit-
ment in the O-phase.
In contrast to Mayer’s strategy, Hardy-Kent’s strategy
is symmetric with respect to the value of b that Alice
unveils in the O-phase. The lower limit PAliceHK err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
)
is independent of her disclosure of b. The upper bound of
the mutual information IAliceHK for Hardy-Kent’s strategy
is written in terms of PAliceHK err(ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) as
IAliceHK (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) = 1−H(PAliceHK err(ρB0 , ρB1 )), (28)
which is considered to be a good information-theoretic
measure of Alice’s ability to change commit bit b in this
strategy.
To compare the cheating performances of Alice
and Bob for both Mayer’s and Hardy-Kent’s strate-
gies, we plot the three information theoretic measures
IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
), IAliceM (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
), and IAliceHK (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) in Fig.
1 as a function of the fidelity F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) chosen as a com-
mon parameter. This figure clearly shows that there is
a trade-off relationship between Bob’s available informa-
tion in the C-phase (IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
)) and Alice’s ability to
change commit bit b in the O-phase (IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
)). It
is clear that the sum is bounded; i.e.,
IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) + IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) ≤ 1 (29)
(for i = M,HK). This equation is a direct consequence
of Eq. (15), showing a trade-off relationship between the
distinguishability D(ρB
0
, ρB
1
), a measure of Bob’s infor-
mation gain in the C-phase, and the fidelity F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
),
a measure of Alice’s ability to change commit bit in the
4
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FIG. 1. Three information-theoretic measures
IBob(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ), I
Alice
M (ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ), and I
Alice
HK (ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ) are plot-
ted against fidelity F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ). Entropy of entanglement
E
(∣∣ψABb 〉) is also plotted for reader’s information.
O-phase. Therefore, there is a trade-off in the perfor-
mance of Alice’s and Bob’s cheating. Figure 1 also shows
that Hardy-Kent’s strategy is superior to Mayer’s with
respect to ability to change commit bit b when the value
of F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) is large.
IV. DISCUSSION
A secure BC protocol must not allow cheating by ei-
ther parties, Alice or Bob. To satisfy this condition, both
IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) and IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) should vanish simultane-
ously. However, Fig. 1 indicates that this requirement
is never satisfied because of the trade-off relationship
between IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) and IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
). In addition,
even if we choose a balanced condition for both parties,
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) ∼ 1/√2, both IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) and IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
)
are already large enough. Therefore, it is concluded that
a law of quantum physics does not help to improve the
security of the BC protocol.
As already proven generally by Mayers, Lo, and Chau,
this conclusion should be valid not only for the partic-
ular cheating strategies described in this paper but also
for any strategies that Alice and Bob can choose. To
understand this conclusion, consider the entropy of en-
tanglement (or entanglement in brief), which is known to
be a unique measure of the amount of entanglement for
the pure state. [10,16,17] Entanglement of the purifica-
tion
∣∣ψABb 〉 is defined as the von Neumann entropy of the
marginal state ρBb of
∣∣ψABb 〉 or equivalently as the Shan-
non entropy of the squares of the Schmidt coefficients of∣∣ψABb 〉. From Eqs. (5), (4), (13), and (16), it is easily
calculated as
E
(∣∣ψABb 〉) = S (ρBb ) = 1− IBob(ρB0 , ρB1 ). (30)
Here, it should be noted that IBob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) is equivalent
to maximum information Ic available from ρ
B
b that is
transmitted from Alice to Bob in the C-phase; that is,
Ic = I
Bob(ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = 1− E (∣∣ψABb 〉) . (31)
Applying Eqs. (1) and (29) to (31), we obtain the in-
equality,
IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
) ≤ E (∣∣ψABb 〉) = Io. (32)
This inequality implies two things. First, the per-
formance of Alice’s cheating, when it is measured by
IAlicei (ρ
B
0
, ρB
1
), is bounded by the entanglement of the
purification E
(∣∣ψABb 〉), which is determined only by its
marginal state ρBb (see Eq. (30)). Second, it is also
bounded by the amount of information Io that is revealed
in the O-phase.
These implications are reasonable for the following rea-
son. When Alice wants to cheat Bob, what she can do
is restricted to local operation and measurement on the
subsystem A in her hand after she has revealed ρBb by
transmitting the subsystem B. It is known to be a fun-
damental law of quantum information processing that
entanglement cannot be increased if we are allowed to
perform only local operations and subselection on the
subsystem of a joint system. In this restricted situa-
tion, the best she can do to cheat is use the local unitary
operation that conserves the entanglement shared in the
joint system and keeps the marginal states ρBb unchanged.
Otherwise, the strategy must be by far an optimal one
because a fraction of the entanglement must be lost from
the joint system and dissipate into the environment dur-
ing the local operation. Under such circumstances, Alice
can change the information content encoded only in the
relative phase between coefficients of each term in the pu-
rification
∣∣ψABb 〉, but she cannot change the information
content encoded in their absolute values. It is the en-
tanglement resource that is responsible for Alice’s cheat-
ing, and there is no cheating strategy that can break the
bound given by entanglement E
(∣∣ψABb 〉) as shown in Eq.
(32). In addition, it is also reasonable that only partial
information that is to be revealed in the O-phase can
be used for Alice’s cheating but the partial information
already revealed in the C-phase cannot. Conversely, we
must be aware that Alice makes use of partial informa-
tion that is reserved to be revealed in the O-phase as an
entanglement resource for cheating.
It is worth noting that the present proof can be re-
garded as a concrete example of the general proof of the
no-go theorem for a zero-knowledge-convincing protocol
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recently given by Horodecki et al. [18] Our proof clearly
indicates that if Alice wants to convince Bob that she
has a definite value of a commit bit (which is, of course,
classical information) in mind in the C-phase, the infor-
mation provided by her to him in the C-phase has to
carry nontrivial information about the commit bit in her
mind. If the information revealed in the C-phase is in-
dependent of her commit bit, Alice can always try to
cheat by proposing the test which would give some result
with certainty and independently of her commit bit in the
O-phase. Our proof suggests an information-theoretic
ground for the no-go theorem of the zero-knowledge-
convincing protocol. Namely, any protocol with a test
message that convinces Bob that Alice knows some state
φ (which is, in general, quantum information), the test
message has to carry non-zero information about state φ
to prevent Alice’s cheating.
The present proof implies that the conjecture of May-
ers about two-party secure computation, which states
that the symmetric protocol might be possible whereas
the asymmetric tasks, such as unidirectional secure com-
putations, would be impossible, is correct. [1] In the uni-
directional two-party computation, which allows only one
of the two parties to learn the result, both members of the
party can be a cheater and security requirements for both
members are incompatible. Such unidirectional protocols
under the standard nonrelativistic assumption are neces-
sarily insecure. We believe that unidirectional quantum
communication does not achieve more than classical com-
munication alone in the two-party model. However, it has
not yet been proven that no non-trivial cryptographic
tasks in the two-party model using bidirectional quan-
tum communication are unconditionally secure. Indeed,
there are some proposals on the quantum protocols for
non-trivial weaker tasks in two-party bidirectional quan-
tum communication such as quantum coin-tossing [19]
and quantum gambling. [20] It will still be important to
solve the general problem concerning what is possible and
what is impossible in two-party secure computation when
unproven computational assumptions are abandoned.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have given constructive proof why an
unconditionally secure quantum BC is impossible in the
light of quantum information theory. The BC protocol
is in essence the protocol in which one-bit information is
split and revealed in two temporally separated steps: the
C-phase and the O-phase. It ensures only a fraction of
the bit information is revealed at a time. In the quantum
BC protocol, increasing the information revealed in the
C-phase is to Bob’s advantage; conversely, increasing the
information revealed in the O-phase makes things to Al-
ice’s advantage. This situation is similar to the classical
protocol. Furthermore, the protocol that is unbiased to
both Alice and Bob is not secure for both. Therefore, it
is impossible to design a BC protocol whose security is
established solely on the law of quantum physics.
In addition, it has been clarified that, Alice can make
use of the entanglement resource, which is equal to the
amount of information reserved to be revealed in the O-
phase, to cheat. To prevent Alice’s cheating, the informa-
tion revealed in the C-phase must depend on her commit
bit, and it must inevitably carry non-zero information
about her commitment. It can be concluded that quan-
tum mechanics itself makes designing an unconditionally
secure BC protocol impossible.
APPENDIX A: A PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF
MUTUALLY ORTHOGONAL PURIFICATIONS
OF ρBb
Suppose that the states χABb (b = 0, 1) of joint sys-
tem AB that is to be prepared by Alice are mutually
orthogonal on the joint space HAB = HA ⊗HB; i.e.,
χAB
0
χAB
1
= χAB
1
χAB
0
= 0. (A1)
Because χAB
0
and χAB
1
commute, they can be diago-
nalized simultaneously in terms of orthonormal bases{∣∣eAB〉} and {∣∣fAB〉} in HAB as follows:
χAB
0
=
∑
λe
∣∣eAB〉 〈eAB∣∣ ,
χAB
1
=
∑
λf
∣∣fAB〉 〈fAB∣∣ , (A2)
where
{∣∣eAB〉} and {∣∣fAB〉} are mutually orthogonal;
i.e.,
〈
eAB|fAB〉 = 〈fAB|eAB〉 = 0, and {λe} and {λf}
are sets of real eigenvalues of χABb satisfying 0 ≤ λe, λf ≤
1 and
∑
λe =
∑
λf = 1. Thus, χ
AB
0
and χAB
1
have
orthogonal supports in HAB. Marginal states revealed
by Alice to Bob in the C-phase are commutable and, in
general, nonorthogonal states. Using this representation,
we can write them as
ρB
0
= TrAχ
AB
0
=
∑
λeTrA
∣∣eAB〉 〈eAB∣∣ ,
ρB
1
= TrAχ
AB
1
=
∑
λfTrA
∣∣fAB〉 〈fAB∣∣ . (A3)
Now, we consider mutually orthonormal states
∣∣ψAB
0
〉
and
∣∣ψAB
1
〉
(
〈
ψAB
0
|ψAB
1
〉
= 0) that lie in the subspace
to which χAB
0
and χAB
1
belong respectively; i.e.,∣∣ψAB
0
〉
=
∑
ce
∣∣eAB〉 ,∣∣ψAB
1
〉
=
∑
cf
∣∣fAB〉 . (A4)
Then, the marginal states for them are
TrA
∣∣ψAB
0
〉 〈
ψAB
0
∣∣ =∑ |ce|2 TrA ∣∣eAB〉 〈eAB∣∣
+
∑
cec
∗
e′TrA
∣∣eAB〉 〈e′AB∣∣ ,
T rA
∣∣ψAB
1
〉 〈
ψAB
1
∣∣ =∑ |cf |2 TrA ∣∣fAB〉 〈fAB∣∣
+
∑
cfc
∗
f ′TrA
∣∣fAB〉 〈f ′AB∣∣ . (A5)
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Because the states of subsystem A represent the classical
information transferred from Alice to Bob in the O-phase,
different states
∣∣eAB〉 6= ∣∣e′AB〉 and ∣∣fAB〉 6= ∣∣f ′AB〉 are
orthogonal on the subspace HA. Therefore,
TrA
∣∣eAB〉 〈e′AB∣∣ = TrA ∣∣fAB〉 〈f ′AB∣∣ = 0. (A6)
By noting that the second terms in Eq. (A5) vanishes, it
is concluded that by choosing ce and cf so that
λe = |ce|2 ,
λf = |cf |2 , (A7)
it is always possible to obtain mutually orthogonal purifi-
cation
∣∣ψABb 〉 of ρABb in the subspace in which the support
of the state χABb lies.
APPENDIX B: PROBABILITY THAT BOB
DETECTS ALICE’S CHEATING
Suppose that the state of subsystem A is measured to
be
∣∣eAj 〉 when A of the joint system AB prepared in the
state
∣∣ψABb 〉 〈ψABb ∣∣ is subjected to projection measure-
ment by the orthonormal basis
{∣∣eAj 〉} for HA. Accord-
ing to general results of quantum measurement theory,
the state of the subsystem B is projected onto the pure
state
ρBb
(∣∣eAj 〉) =
〈
eAj |ψABb
〉 〈
ψABb |eAj
〉
TrB
〈
eAj |ψABb
〉 〈
ψABb |eAj
〉 . (B1)
From Eqs. (5) and (4), it is easily seen that
〈
ψAB
0
|eAj
〉 〈
eAj |ψAB1
〉
=
sin 2θ
2
(〈
1AB|eAj
〉 〈
eAj |1AB
〉
− 〈0AB|eAj 〉 〈eAj |0AB〉) . (B2)
Therefore, we find that, if and only if the basis
{∣∣eAj 〉} is
chosen so that the overlap between
∣∣eAj 〉 and ∣∣0AB〉 and
that between
∣∣eAj 〉 and ∣∣1AB〉 are the same, i.e.,〈
0AB|eAj
〉 〈
eAj |0AB
〉
=
〈
1AB|eAj
〉 〈
eAj |1AB
〉
, (B3)
the states ρB
0
(∣∣eAj 〉) and ρB1 (∣∣eAj 〉) become mutu-
ally orthogonal. In the quantum BC protocol, Al-
ice and Bob agree to use the measurement basis{
ρB
0
(∣∣eAj 〉) , ρB1 (∣∣eAj 〉)} on subsystem B that has a one-
to-one correspondence to a state
∣∣eAj 〉 on A through the
joint state
∣∣ψABb 〉 〈ψABb ∣∣. She reveals to Bob the mea-
surement basis
{
ρB
0
(∣∣eAj 〉) , ρB1 (∣∣eAj 〉)} associated with
her state
∣∣eAj 〉 in the O-phase, and he measures his sub-
system B by this basis.
Now, we consider the probability PAliceerr that Alice
causes an inconsistency between the value of b that is
unveiled by her in the O-phase and Bob’s measured data
when Alice prepares an honest state χABb . Alice projects
her subsystem A of the joint system AB prepared in χABb
onto a state
∣∣eAj 〉 among the complete orthonormal basis{∣∣eAj 〉} for space HA. She can perform such a projection
on her subsystem at her own free will. Correspondingly,
the state of Bob’s system is projected to be
ρ˜Bb
(∣∣eAj 〉) =
〈
eAj
∣∣χABb ∣∣eAj 〉
TrB
〈
eAj
∣∣χABb ∣∣eAj 〉 . (B4)
Here, from Appendix A, the states
∣∣ψABb 〉 〈ψABb ∣∣ and χABb
satisfy 〈
eAj |ψABb
〉 〈
ψABb |eAj
〉
=
〈
eAj
∣∣χABb ∣∣eAj 〉 . (B5)
Then, we obtain the identity ρb
(∣∣eAj 〉) = ρ˜b (∣∣eAj 〉). This
identity implies that if Bob follows Alice’s instruction and
measures his system by the measurement basis given by
her, the value of b unveiled by Alice in the O-phase is
perfectly correlated with Bob’s measurement result, no
matter what Alice prepares
∣∣ψABb 〉 〈ψABb ∣∣ or χABb . There-
fore, if Bob is honest enough to follow Alice’s instruction,
the probability PAliceerr that Bob finds an inconsistency in
his data vanishes if Alice prepares
∣∣ψABb 〉 〈ψABb ∣∣ or χABb .
Consequently, Alice can transmit one bit of classical in-
formation to Bob with certainty.
Next, we consider the probability PAliceerr when Al-
ice prepares a fake state
∣∣ψ¯AB〉 that lies in joint space
HAB. When the joint system AB prepared in the state∣∣ψ¯AB〉 〈ψ¯AB∣∣ is subjected to the projection measurement
by using the orthonormal basis
{∣∣eAj 〉} for HA and the
result is
∣∣eAj 〉, the state of the subsystem B is projected
onto the pure state
ρ¯B
(∣∣eAj 〉) =
〈
eAj |ψ¯AB
〉 〈
ψ¯AB|eAj
〉
TrB
〈
eAj |ψ¯AB
〉 〈
ψ¯AB |eAj
〉 . (B6)
Let the fidelity between ρ¯B
(∣∣eAj 〉) and ρBb (∣∣eAj 〉) be
F
(
ρ¯B
(∣∣eAj 〉) , ρBb (∣∣eAj 〉)). Then, the probability PAliceerr
that Bob finds an inconsistency in his data is given by
PAliceerr = 1−
∣∣F (ρ¯B (∣∣eAj 〉) , ρBb (∣∣eAj 〉))∣∣2 . (B7)
Under the condition of Eq. (B3), it follows that
〈
ψAB |eAj
〉 〈
eAj |ψABb
〉
=
1
2
TrAB
∣∣eAj 〉 〈eAj ∣∣PM
· 〈ψAB|ψABb 〉 , (B8)
TrB
〈
eAj |ψAB
〉 〈
ψAB |eAj
〉
= TrB
〈
eAj |ψABb
〉 〈
ψABb |eAj
〉
≥ 1
2
TrAB
∣∣eAj 〉 〈eAj ∣∣PM , (B9)
where PM =
∣∣0AB〉 〈0AB∣∣ + ∣∣1AB〉 〈1AB∣∣ is the projec-
tor onto two-dimensional subspace M in HAB that is
spanned by a set of orthonormal states
{∣∣0AB〉 , ∣∣1AB〉},
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and TrAB
∣∣eAj 〉 〈eAj ∣∣PM = 〈0AB|eAj 〉 〈eAj |0AB〉 +〈
1AB|eAj
〉 〈
eAj |1AB
〉
is the overlap between the state
∣∣eAj 〉
inHA and subspaceM . The equal sign in inequality (B9)
holds if and only if state
∣∣ψ¯AB〉 lies within subspace M .
From Eqs. (B1),(B6),(B8), and (B9), we obtain
∣∣F (ρ¯B (∣∣eAj 〉) , ρBb (∣∣eAj 〉))∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣〈ψAB|ψABb 〉∣∣2 . (B10)
Applying Eq. (B10) to Eq. (B7), we finally obtain
PAliceerr ≥ 1−
∣∣〈ψAB|ψABb 〉∣∣2 . (B11)
Here, equality holds if and only if the state
∣∣ψ¯AB〉 lies
within subspace M .
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